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develop themselves. I also argue, using the work of Elinor Ostrom (1990), that trust emerges 
first within small-scale communities, where first- and second-degree collective action prob-
lems need to be resolved. The development of a social disposition to trust is closely linked 
with an institutional context that encourages individuals to take the externalities of their ac-
tions into account. This is made possible by customary mechanisms, as the development of 
social trust at this stage cannot rely on a mighty “Leviathan”. Therefore, this paper questions 
the claim that social trust is the product of market exchanges. 
Market exchanges might favor the further growth of social trust, hands in hands 
with the right institutional frame. However, this growth is not just the transposition of 
a previously acquired disposition to trust. The work of Henry Sumner Maine interest-
ingly underlines the importance of the co-development of institutions and trust, from 
its origin in small communities to its expansion to market exchanges. Both Ostrom’s 
and Maine’s perspectives underline the fact that trust and trustworthiness are comple-
mentary and question a-rational perspectives on trust. This paper also elaborates on the 
claim, coming from the literature on contract law, that focusing on sanctioning mecha-
nisms can be highly counterproductive.
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Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the question of the emergence of social trust 
and its relation to market exchanges, using insights from Henry Sumner Maine 
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(1822-1888) and Elinor Ostrom (1933-2012). Economists have sometimes given 
contradictory functions to trust: it might be considered as the basis for market 
exchanges, but it might also be described either as a supplement or, even further, 
as a product of market relations. Indeed, if trust is a basis for market relations, 
then it means that it might come from external and pre-existing conditions, which 
could conflict with the idea that market societies produce trust between individu-
als, allowing strangers to exchange with each other. Also, the idea that trust could 
be a supplement to market relations (Arrow, 1972) is ambiguous: is trust a natural 
by-product of markets relations alone, made to stabilize exchanges? Is it a “patch” 
put in place by societies against the normative disruption caused by markets? 
It has been noted that individuals that are more exposed to markets have a 
stronger sense of fairness and reciprocity than those who live in closed and small-
scale communities (Zak and Knack 2001). Reactivating a classical doux commerce 
argument, compelling critiques of the anti-commodification literature (Brennan 
and Jaworski 2015) have argued that while some norms might be dissolved by 
markets, they can also promote tolerance and openness to foreigners, especially 
beyond the boundaries of one’s communities. In this frame, small-scale communi-
ties tend to be opposed to large-scale communities that are more complex and 
integrated to markets, and of which members are ready to trust non-members of 
their network of personal relationships. Therefore, trust would be a strong feature 
of complex societies, as opposed to more traditional societies. While in closed-
communities, individuals’ moral behavior would be based on direct peer-pressure, 
and where one’s reputation of being an unreliable person would be very damaging 
to one’s social life, large-scale societies, integrated to markets, do seem to rely on 
people’s willingness to behave fairly with strangers, even when they could take 
advantage of them with little to no repercussions.
The point of this paper is to question this dichotomy. Following Bowles (2016), 
one can argue that markets are not self-sustaining and that they rely on norms and 
institutions that lie beyond them and cannot be reduced to them. In this frame, 
social trust is part of a “civic culture” that includes institutions, both being es-
sential to markets. Markets therefore prosper on a fertile institutional ground, and 
their development confirms that pre-disposition by expanding individuals’ ability 
to trust strangers. Not surprisingly, law as an institution plays a significant role in 
this institutional framing. Meanwhile, this does not solve two problems: first, the 
one of the emergence of social trust and second, the one of how social trust can be 
enlarged to market relationships, if it originates in a previous context.  
I thereby base my reflection on the following hypotheses: trust is a preexisting 
condition that is transferred from small-scale communities to large ones, that are 
more integrated to markets. Markets prosper on social trust and might only foster 
it. Following this, markets might appear as a “parasite on tradition” (Bowles 2011), 
as they rely on a preexisting social capital to thrive. A second though essential 
idea is that trust is accumulated as a “social capital” (Ostrom, 1990) at the level of 
small-scale communities and thanks to their institutions. This paper clarifies and 
exemplifies this set of hypotheses by exploring and connecting the works of two 
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authors, the Victorian jurist Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888) and Elinor Ostrom 
(1933-2012). 
The work of the 19th century jurist Henry Sumner Maine provides a frame where 
the development of markets is made possible by  the expansion of social trust from 
networks of personal relations to impersonal interactions. In this process, contract 
law is essential. As will be explained, Maine’s involvement in the drafting of the 
Indian Contract Law of 1872 is a result of that belief.  Moreover, Maine’s descrip-
tion of “village-communities” and their evolution, that one can compare to the Os-
tromian commons, provides conceptual tools to analyze the following problems:
If trust is not produced by markets and modern institutions themselves and 
comes from an earlier stage of social relationships, then,
1/ how does this transition from small-scale communities to large-scale coopera-
tion on markets take place?
2/ how can an infinite regress problem be avoided, since trust needs to emerge 
at some point?
Meanwhile, Elinor Ostrom’s research on the commons shows that trust emerges 
first within small-scale communities. It is on this level that first and second-degree 
collective action problems are resolved, laying the foundations for the accumula-
tion of trust as social capital. The commons provide us with a paradigmatic exam-
ple of how individuals can start finding each other trustworthy, even when a social 
disposition to trust has not yet been developed. 
The argument of this paper is developed as follows. In a first section, the work 
of Brennan and Jaworski (2015) will be analyzed as a recent example of the argu-
ment that markets promote trust (1.1). This view is then discussed to highlight 
how markets rely on pre-existing social dispositions and especially on trust, as 
illustrated in the literature on contractual relations (1.2). Then, a discussion of 
Luhmann’s concept of “systemic” trust aims at showing that such an institutional 
perspective must not neglect the fact that personal and systemic trust cannot be 
strictly distinguished, as well as the role of trustworthiness cannot be forgotten, in 
order to explain the emergence and expansion of trust as a social disposition (1.3). 
In a second section, it will be argued that the Ostromian literature emphasizes the 
fact that trust is an institutional product at any level of human cooperation (2.1), 
that the commons are a paradigmatic example of this process (2.2). As a specific 
context, thanks to customary mechanisms, the commons illustrate how individu-
als can get a direct and empirical confirmation of the belief that others are trust-
worthy, allowing for the development of a widespread social disposition to trust 
(2.3). A third and last section dwells on Henry Sumner Maine’s interesting insights 
about the extension of social trust to markets, starting from small communities or 
“village communities” (3.1). Interestingly, this extension is presented by Maine as 
a two-fold process: the gradual transformation of property rules allows for the de-
velopment of both contractual relationships and a social disposition to trust (3.2). 
Maine’s involvement in the Indian Contract Act of 1872 illustrates this dynamic 
quite clearly (3.3). 
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1. Markets and layers of trust
1.1 Trust as a product of market exchanges?
While Arrow (1972) only assumed that some values and social behaviors like 
trust and trustworthiness might be essential for market relationships to happen, 
recent criticisms of anti-commodification arguments have emphasized or reacti-
vated the  opposite claim that markets do, in fact, foster pro-social tendencies, with 
a focus on trust and fairness. 
Brennan and Jaworski (2015) are particularly representative of that trend. Their 
main goal is to defend the neutrality of markets regarding morals. Indeed, their 
main argument is that, when it comes to markets, “it’s the how, not the what” 
(2015: 29). In their view, markets themselves are just a process where prices are 
attributed to goods, they do not promote or foster negative values, or corrode 
good ones. “Wrongness” in possession must exist prior to markets to consider that 
something might not be bought or sold. Therefore, if it is allowed to possess or 
do something for free, it must be allowed to put it on a market (2015: 10-11). The 
point is therefore to shift the focus from the “what”, which kinds of goods could 
markets sell or not, to the how: how can markets in goods, when they are not for-
bidden already, be regulated (2015: 25)?
Nevertheless, Brennan and Jaworski’s point goes further: it upholds the classical 
idea (as a matter of fact, they quote Voltaire on the London Stock Exchange, see Bren-
nan and Jaworski 2015: 25) that markets promote “tolerance and openness”, even 
though they might lead to the decrease of traditional forms of solidarity (2015: 93). 
Their point focuses in fact on trust, as they propose a short literature review of the em-
pirical studies that established a link between market exposure and the ability to trust. 
Neuroeconomist Paul Zak (2008) argues that studies on the topic show a strong corre-
lation between exposure to markets and the tendency, among individuals, to make fair 
offers to strangers. In one of these studies, Herbert Gintis argues that market exposure 
is strongly correlated with higher levels and fairness (2012). Zak and Stephen Knack 
(2001) purport to show that market societies are high-trust societies, while non-market 
societies are low-trust societies. Al Ubayli et al. (2013) noted that using cues that are 
usually connected with the frame of market relationships make people more “trust-
ing”, “trustworthy” and “fair” (these are Brennan and Jaworski’s words). 
Nonetheless, these studies do not quite support the sweeping point that mar-
ket societies make individuals trustworthy, trusting and behave fairly. They merely 
show that markets might reinforce such dispositions, only if it is required by the 
nature of the interactions in question. Also, one cannot so easily conclude that 
since higher degrees of trust and willingness to be fair are necessary to market 
relationships, individuals have higher or stronger moral values. As Gintis noted, 
“fairness motivations” are simply “more pronounced” for individuals who are ex-
posed to market economies. Meanwhile, in “simple societies” that are less exposed 
to markets, all types of games (ultimatum, public good and trust games) still pro-
vided strong results. Therefore, contradicting the point that markets make people 
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immoral by showing that they do foster pro-social tendencies does not prove at all 
that these abilities were not present already. 
Even more so, concluding to the higher morality of individuals in such societies 
appears to be a leap of logic, that Brennan and Jaworski fortunately do not seem to 
make, as they only argue that “market systems require a high degree of generalized 
trust and trustworthiness to function” (2015: 98). In fact, the detail of their argu-
ment points to a certain sensitivity to context: they underline that studies showed 
that introducing money into large groups made people more cooperative (Camera, 
Casari, and Bigoni 2013), while introducing it in small-scale interactions makes 
them less trusting of each other. More precisely, activating the frame of markets in 
personal relationships signals “a lack of trust” (Brennan and Jaworski 2015: 98). 
Brennan and Jaworski thus seem open to the idea that the kind of trust one finds in 
markets and large-scale societies is another kind of social trust than the one might 
find in small-scale communities. Their argument, as we understand it, is not that 
the latter simply do not rely on social trust, but rather that there is one particular 
kind of trust, essential to market exchanges, that is a social disposition to interact 
with foreigners, predisposing individuals to find them trustworthy. 
1.2. Trust as a “civic culture”
From a different perspective, an institutional approach to the problem high-
lights the fact that markets rely on pre-existing institutions and social dispositions, 
including trust, to function. In Bowles’s words, this makes markets “a parasite on 
tradition” (2011). In simplistic terms, trade requires two main kinds of institutions 
to thrive on a large scale, beyond small communities and personal relationships: 
stable property rights and efficient contract law. As a consequence, the rule of law 
is likely to be a crucial element for the development of markets, as it provides sta-
bility to individual expectations. The guarantee that an external authority is able 
to use sanctions to enforce property rights and contractual rules therefore plays an 
important part in the development of markets. 
The security of expectations might depend on a third-party that will be able to 
enforce sanctions. In the words of Hobbes, this makes the Leviathan a necessary 
condition for the emergence of markets (Hobbes 1651: VI, I, XV), as it is for so-
cial cooperation in general. Nevertheless, this Hobbesian paradigm does seem to 
rely on the assumption that individuals cannot trust each other without the threat 
of external sanctions, as Gunning (1972) argues in the case of contracts1. Also, 
relying on the sanctions of an external enforcer for expectations to be guaranteed 
appears more as the opposite of social trust than a way to achieve it. Indeed, the 
1 One of the reviewers pointed to the fact that Hobbes’s work in itself is rather an en-
deavor to give authority some legitimacy rather than defending sanctions as the way to establish 
trust between individuals. This is indeed Hobbes’s main purpose. Nonetheless, one could argue 
that the anthropological assumptions underlying his Leviathan make sanctions the only guarantee 
of contracts and therefore, of market exchanges. These assumptions lie at the heart of many reflec-
tions from economists like Gunning, who are the target of the critique we are putting forth here. 
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idea that trust can only be established thanks to the certainty that free-riders and 
non-cooperators will be sanctioned sounds both idealistic and contradictory. On 
the one hand, one can hardly believe that in any complex society, all free-riders 
can be caught and sanctioned. Individuals must therefore trade and interact even 
though some might escape sanctions if they want. 
Moreover, studies tend to show that the possibility of sanctions does not neces-
sarily lead individuals to be more cooperative or fair in their exchanges (Barr and 
Wallace, 2009, Henrich et al. 2010), especially when it comes to contracts. On the 
contrary, the threat of sanctions can undermine cooperative tendencies. More gen-
erally, the idea that market exchanges and cooperation mostly rely on the existence 
of an authority that can punish non-cooperators comes from a disproportionate 
focus on the protection of rights and, as explained by Malhotra et al. (2011) on 
control, disregarding the important role of coordination, especially in contract law. 
Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) also highlight the importance of the structure of 
contracts to foster interpersonal trust.
Voluntary exchanges are in fact based on a large set of shared conventions, 
where trust plays an essential role. If one pictures the diversity of exchanges and 
interactions that take place on markets, one will realize that enforcement is usually 
distant, and rights simply assumed to be respected. When one buys something on 
the spot on a market, the seller seldom has the obligation to prove that what he is 
selling belongs to him. Conversely, one is not necessarily considered as a thief if 
one buys stolen goods in good faith. 
Also, the threat of sanctions from an external authority seems little relevant 
when one entrusts primary products to a manufacturer in exchange of the later 
deliverance of refined goods. Similarly, it was shown that trust is more effective 
between contractual partners than specifying all the terms of the contracts (Lorenz 
1999). Therefore, not only contracts cannot be complete, but the completeness 
of contracts is counterproductive (Brown, Falk and Fehr 2004). As asserted by 
Bowles in The Moral Economy (2016), the emphasis must rather be put on the 
virtuous circle that is created when contractual relationships are left to operate on 
their own: when they remain simple and flexible formalities, contracts foster the 
development of trust as much as they rely on it. This is part of Bowles’s argument 
that markets thrive on a pre-existing “civic culture” instead of being its promoters, 
and that institutions can foster social trust as much as they rely on it. This none-
theless does not solve the infinite regress problem that comes from asserting that 
markets both thrive on social trust and produce it.
1.3. Beyond “systemic” trust
Brennan and Jaworski and the literature they base their claims on rightly stress 
the distinction between different kinds of trust. In the meantime, the institutional 
perspective, while drawing our attention on pre-existing social dispositions, does 
not provide a clear answer to the question of the emergence of a trust and how 
personal and systemic trusts are both distinct and related.     
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Luhmann’s functionalist understanding of trust can be of a great support here, for 
the sake of conceptual clarification. Luhmann proposes to distinguish between trust 
as it emerges between individuals who interact frequently (familiarity) and another 
kind of trust, of a more “systemic” nature (1979: chap. 3). Trust has a central role in 
Luhmann’s first works on social systems, in the way that it is instrumental in dealing 
with the radical “contingency” that produces “complexity” and which character-
izes the world before humans start interacting. First interactions soon decrease such 
contingency, by building expectations and patterns that individuals can refer to in 
their later interactions. A social system filters the events that occur in its surrounding 
environment, a factor of complexity that needs to be reduced. 
Trust, at any level, reduces complexity in a specific way: it both reduces some com-
plexity and allows individuals to take the risk of more numerous and complex interac-
tions. In a similar fashion, feelings individuals have for each other allow one individual 
to build a general frame in which the complexity of the other person’s behavior will 
be made manageable. They will not, nonetheless, allow for the flexible development of 
new interactions in the specific way trust does: trust ensures the ability to interact and 
more precisely to cooperate, by forfeiting present gains for the perspective of future 
ones. This is why trust is a favorable condition to the development of more complex 
forms of rationality, including secondary social systems like markets and any coopera-
tive endeavor in general. In this light, trust appears like an essential social “organ”, and 
trade is only one function that this organ allows to perform.  
Personal and systemic trust share the same function: reducing complexity by pro-
ducing a sense of certainty in the absence of actual certainty. But what is the speci-
ficity of systemic trust, that appears essential for markets and complex societies to 
function? According to Luhmann, systemic trust is not built thanks to the personal 
accumulation of positive experiences with trustworthy people: it comes from the sys-
tem that surrounds the individual. Money is a good illustration of this: general infor-
mation on the social system that is currently working is supposedly enough to trust 
complete strangers that also belong to this system. One can trust a person who hands 
them money in a shop. Theoretically, one deceiving individual will not shake our 
belief in the system itself. This is meant to show that systemic trust is not dependent 
on separate personal experiences. It allows us to navigate complex societies where 
we have to interact with strangers and no time or means to test their trustworthiness. 
Nonetheless, the social nature of personal trust cannot be discarded. Taking the 
example of a small community, it would difficult to argue that, for a farmer to trust 
another, all it takes is familiarity. There is no doubt that past actions and demon-
strations of trustworthiness are essential in such a context. Moreover, the kind of 
trust that one shows to a neighbor appears different as the way we trust a shop-
keeper we had never encountered before. Nonetheless, the scale of interactions 
in a farming community does not erase all cooperation problems and the risks 
of seeing conflicts emerging. Trust is a matter of rules, institutions and conflict-
resolution mechanisms at this level as well, as our reading of Ostrom’s work will 
show below.   
In general, Luhmann’s distinction between systemic trust and familiarity must 
not be exaggerated. He acknowledges that both are social products, but at differ-
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ent levels. Indeed, personal trust is not simply a feeling that individuals might have 
for each other, as it is already produced socially, through interactions, for instance 
in the context of the family. It becomes a natural disposition to trust a certain cir-
cle of individuals, based on familiarity. Luhmann’s account therefore points to a 
complementarity of the different kinds of trust but his theory allows to take a step 
further and argue that systemic trust can serve as a background for personal trust, 
instead of the latter being a pre-requisite to the former. 
The example of money shows that trust is a pre-established disposition. The slow 
emergence of non-metallic currencies is proof that interactions that require high lev-
els of trusts need both individual and collective dispositions to develop gradually. 
Trade between strangers, as an interaction that necessitates such high levels of trust, 
must therefore rely on pre-existing collective dispositions that individuals acquire. 
Meanwhile, market exchanges can also lead to the development of personal 
relationships and of the kind of trust they entail: a company can appear more or 
less trustworthy to clients, two regular business partners can form a long-lasting 
relationship of trust. At that level as well, it is difficult to separate the institutional 
elements (an effective contract law, for instance) from the accumulation of posi-
tive experiences. Trustworthiness does matter, as well as rules and coordinating 
devices, at all stages of social cooperation. 
It is therefore possible to elaborate on Luhmann’s typology of the different 
kinds of trust, to sketch an evolutionary frame which would allow us to argue that: 
1/ Trust as it is manifested in market exchanges, despite its specific features and 
institutions, is the product of the gradual development and expansion of a social 
capital, accumulated in small-scale societies, that enables individuals to cooperate 
with each other. It thereby harnesses the potential of that social capital as it was 
developed in small-scale communities. 
2/ Trust and cooperation are learnt at the most basic social level, as illustrated 
by research on the commons. A strict distinction between personal and systemic 
trust is therefore not valid, as trust is always a social product. 
3/ As such, trust is systemic, even at the simplest levels of social cooperation, in the 
way that it does not strictly depend on individual interactions. Meanwhile, relations 
of personal trust are still developed in complex societies, and they thrive on favorable 
institutional contexts. Institutions can also be essential in allowing the development 
of personal trust.  Trust can either be understood as a “social capital”, using Ostrom’s 
words (1990) or as a social disposition that emerges from the positive interactions be-
tween these elements. It therefore does not explain cooperation by itself.
2. Trust as an institutional product for cooperation
2.1. The commons: externalities, trust and cooperation
Institutions that allow for efficient cooperation and the solving of social dilem-
mas on a large scale could not emerge spontaneously and neither could the kind 
of systemic trust that, once accumulated, is necessary for large-scale cooperative 
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endeavors. As argued above, in order to avoid an infinite regress problem, it seems 
necessary to assume that trust emerges at some point, within small communities, 
where individuals cannot rely on a previously accumulated social capital to estab-
lish trusting relationships.  
The commons, as studied by Ostrom and her collaborators, are a paradigmatic ex-
ample of the problem of the emergence of trust2. Indeed, in the commons, establishing 
cooperation seems to be a particularly challenging task. In most cases, communities 
can only rely on internal mechanisms to manage to do it. In a context where no exter-
nal authority can enforce sanctions, it seems necessary that individuals trust each other 
to cooperate. It could be argued that individuals manage to trust each other because 
they are neighbors and/or because they have regular proofs of the trustworthiness of 
the other members of their community, as they interact with them constantly. 
Instead, the literature on the commons does include many examples of failures 
to establish cooperation at the most local level (Berkes, 1986). Also, the story be-
hind successful examples underlines the complexity of that process. Ostrom did 
not provide a list of defined institutions, which would be contrary to her commit-
ment to highlight that there is no given solution to cooperation, everything being 
context dependent. Yet, several criteria are considered by her as instrumental in 
ensuring the success of cooperation in these situations. Trust is not itself one of 
these criteria but developing trust or failing to do so is thus presented as one of 
the main causes of success (or failure) of the commons (Ostrom 1990: 21). For 
instance, Ostrom describes the challenges met by irrigation projects in Sri Lanka 
and identifies the “endemic” nature of “lack of trust” among farmers and between 
them and officials as a major obstacle in the efficient management of infrastructures 
(Ostrom 1990: 167 and Perera 1986: 89-91). In this specific case, it was necessary 
to develop “mutual trust and reciprocity” among members of the farming commu-
nity themselves and officials on a small scale, before reorganizing the maintenance 
of irrigation infrastructure on a large scale. It was essential, to do so, to “nourish” 
trust on a “face-to-face basis”, within small groups, using intermediaries.
Several lessons can be drawn from this paradigmatic example. First, trust ap-
pears to be a necessary foundation for cooperation to appear at all its stages. Sec-
ond, trust does not emerge naturally between “neighbors”, who can instead live 
in deep distrust. On the contrary, the emergence of trust seems to require two 
elements: the rights rules and mechanisms on the one hand, and a feeling that oth-
ers are trustworthy. A mixture of institutions and enforcement mechanisms and 
personal trust therefore appear as necessary for social trust to emerge. 
2.2. The terms of the problem
The question that structures Ostrom’s inquiry in Governing the Commons can 
be stated as follows: how can individuals solve fundamental cooperation problems 
and start trusting each other when they do not have any empirical reason to find 
2 For a fairly complete review of works on the commons, see Ostrom and Hess 2007. 
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each other trustworthy? Interestingly, Ostrom rules out any “non-rational” expla-
nation for cooperation: trust and cooperation must be the reasonable thing to do 
for self-interested utility maximisers, and one cannot rely on explanations such as 
mere familiarity or an “instinct” for cooperation. Fortunately, Ostrom shows that 
the context of the problem is also where its solution is found, which is in a very 
localized context, where individuals are able to design rules that are self-enforcing, 
ensuring the very basis needed to find each other trustworthy. 
What is exactly the problem in the case of the commons? As described in the 
literature on the “commons”, cooperation problems emerge when communities 
need to balance, on the one hand, the appropriation of resources by individuals 
and, on the other hand, the sustainability of such uses, so that resources remain 
available in the future. In Governing the Commons, Ostrom argues that it is by 
finding solutions to such primary cooperation problems that communities gradu-
ally learn to solve cooperation problems, from the simplest to the most complex 
ones. This incremental process, as described by Ostrom, locates a potential origin 
of cooperation in the commons and makes it the start of a learning process where 
the social disposition to trust, a form of “social capital”, expands its scope as coop-
eration reaches new levels of complexity (Ostrom 1990: 187). 
What is the exact nature of this disposition to cooperate, in which trust plays a 
large part? It is more specifically a disposition, by individuals, to take into account 
the externalities or external effects of their actions. The famous “tragedy of the com-
mons” is essentially a problem of negative externalities: individuals who send their 
cattle to graze disregard the negative externalities they are imposing on others. It 
is therefore not surprising that the Ostromian literature on the commons focuses, 
explicitly or not, on proving that the commons can provide mechanisms that deal 
with externalities. Nonetheless, a close analysis of this literature shows that any coop-
eration problem is, in the end, a problem of externalities, whether they are positive 
or negative. Avoiding overexploitation is the most common problem of negative ex-
ternalities but, for instance, having people benefiting from irrigation infrastructures 
without contributing to their maintenance is a positive externalities problem. 
We draw the following conclusion from Ostrom’s work: if social trust is essential 
to cooperation, then it must play an important part in the solution of externality 
problems. Ostrom presents the problem of cooperation in the commons as follows: 
one individual will cooperate if one believes that the other will also cooperate (1990: 
186). We can rephrase this condition: one will cooperate if one believes that the oth-
ers will take the externalities of their actions into account or, in other words, if one 
trusts others to integrate issues of externalities in their actions and interactions. This 
belief, to be a called a social disposition to trust, must not be limited to a one-time 
situation. It must be a belief that others, within one’s community, are generally dis-
posed to integrate issues of externalities in their actions and interactions. 
According to Ostrom, models that claim that the commons are bound to a “trag-
edy” fail to understand how the structure of the commons can foster this kind of 
disposition to trust (Ostrom 1990: chap. 1). Such models underline how coopera-
tion is difficult to achieve and describe accurately the consequences of situations 
when individuals act independently, without communicating, have little interest in 
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long term benefits and “little mutual trust”. Meanwhile, in the “localized physical 
setting” of the commons, it is possible but of course not necessary that individuals 
“can learn whom to trust, what effects their actions will have on each other and on 
the CPR, and how to organize themselves to gain benefits and avoid harm” (1990: 
183). Avoiding harm here must mean avoiding reciprocal harm, since in the context 
of the commons, the simple nature of cooperation emerges: avoiding indirect harm 
to others, in the shape of externalities, is the only way to avoid harm to oneself. 
2.3. The crucible of trust as a social disposition
One could conclude, from Ostrom’s mere hints about the role of trust in the 
commons, that the specific nature of interactions in such settings fosters the ap-
pearance of trust. However, why would trust and cooperation find their origin in 
such an environment? Ostrom’s view of cooperation as a long and incremental 
learning process is a response to what she sees, along with collective action theo-
rists (Olson 1975), as the main defect of a Hobbesian paradigm: how could one 
expect individuals to take a sudden leap from the complete absence of cooperation 
to full subjection to the Leviathan? It seems necessary that individuals have a pri-
or ability to trust each other’s ability to cooperate. Indeed, cooperation is strictly 
conditional. This implies that one cooperates only if others commit themselves to 
show cooperative behaviors (Ostrom 1990: 99-100). Restricting oneself and not 
overexploiting the commons without some guarantee than others will do the same 
would not be a rational decision. Where can guarantees be found where the Le-
viathan is by definition absent? Ostrom’s demonstration on the functioning of the 
commons are meant to show that these guarantees are provided by the context and 
the mechanisms that we see as typical of customary institutions (1990 chap. 1-2). 
Nevertheless, trust remains a leap of faith: such mechanisms can only provide 
a frame that allows for it to grow. Are we lost in an infinite regress where trust is 
always necessary for trust to emerge? The commons demonstrate that there is an 
environment where individuals can commit to cooperation, without much priori 
information on others’ trustworthiness, because they are physically close and share 
similar issues on a similar territory. For instance, one has strong incentives to watch 
if one’s neighbor is not pumping too much water from a common irrigation struc-
ture, since he or she will be the first person impacted. In such contexts, everybody 
is watching everybody, and everybody has a personal interest in watching others 
and reporting frauds. Committing oneself to conditional cooperation (“I will if you 
will”) is therefore still a leap of faith, but one that will directly push co-contractors 
to enforce the rules. This is where the virtuous circle of trust begins: the condi-
tional commitment to cooperation drives individuals to monitor each other and 
this monitoring, if it confirms that others are indeed cooperating, validates that 
trust is empirically founded and therefore a rational decision (Ostrom 1990: 187).
This can be rephrased as follows: trust, to emerge, requires the ability to believe 
that others will reciprocate cooperative behaviors. For one individual to cooperate, 
it is necessary that he or she believes that it is expected of everyone, in a specific con-
text, to follow specific rules of cooperation. This belief is therefore strictly about the 
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normative aspect of this context. One pays its taxes believing that others will do too 
and believing that those who do not will be sanctioned. Nonetheless, compliance to 
tax laws in our societies can be described as “quasi-voluntary” (Levi 1988: 23), since 
this belief is not necessarily confirmed empirically and because there are no real 
guarantees of the other’s obedience to the rule. Indeed, those two correlative beliefs 
come with no confirmation or immediate guarantee and the entire system relies on 
the preexisting trust in the cooperative behavior of others. On the contrary, in the 
commons, individuals can get empirical confirmation of their normative beliefs: the 
possibility for individuals to monitor each other in the localized context of the com-
mons ensures that there is no disconnection between normative expectations and 
their empirical confirmation. Trust can therefore start from that point.
The commons are characterized by the general diffusion of the individuals’ abil-
ity to monitor and sanction each other. Ostrom, taking the example of Turkish 
fisheries, observes that “cheating on the system will be observed by the very fishers 
who have rights to be in the best spots and will be willing to defend their rights 
using physical means if necessary (…)”, meaning, in this case, cutting the nets 
of non-cooperators (1990: 20). When talking about the huertas of the region of 
Valencia in Spain, and of their irrigation infrastructures, Ostrom provides the fol-
lowing illustration of what she describes as the reciprocity of mutual monitoring 
and sanctioning (1990: 74): 
Instead of reciprocity, one could see this as a circular system, that matches the 
need to produce a virtuous circle of trust, one where expectations are directly 
confirmed by empirical assessments (Ostrom 1990: 187). Empirical confirmations 
come in two sorts: confirmation that actual non-cooperators are spotted and sanc-
tioned, which is not necessarily the case for an external authority that might miss 
some of them and incriminate the wrong people, but also confirmation that others 
do indeed cooperate, as individuals get first-hand information on compliance rates 
(Ostrom 1990: 74-75). Every member of the community has thus access to empiri-
cal confirmations of the normative efficiency of the system.
This direct relationship between facts and norms thus appears to be founda-
tional in the institutionalization of cooperation, thanks to the way it fosters the 
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development of a disposition to trust others. This is even more related to trust 
that this structure allows for both a high rate of compliance to rules on the one 
hand, and a low level of actual sanctions on the other hand. Sanctioning appears 
little relevant in a context where one’s trust in others cooperative behavior get 
validated and reinforced by empirical data. Conversely, following an evolution-
ary frame, one could assume that this is the very reason why individuals can 
learn to trust without the need for sanctions and with no direct proof of others’ 
trustworthiness.
One could believe that once the ability to trust and cooperate is learnt in a 
context like the commons, then it can be extended to a wide range of situations, 
including market exchanges. The work of Henry Sumner Maine provides a frame 
that allows us to conceptualize this transition, by highlighting how it relies on a 
gradual institutional evolution that involves contracts. Also, Maine and his con-
temporaries were also interested in how communities managed resources in com-
mon and how it affected the structure of their property-relations. In Maine’s work, 
the “commons” are called “village-communities”. There is therefore a parallel to 
establish between Maine and Ostrom, a connection that is acknowledged by Os-
trom herself (Ostrom and Hess 2007). 
3. Trust, markets and contract law in Henry Sumner Maine’s work
3.1. From “village-communities” to markets
Henry Sumner Maine’s work, especially Ancient Law, published in 1861, is fa-
mous for the idea that societies evolved from a state where individual rights were 
primarily defined by status, to a state where individuals get rights with little regard 
to their status within the family or the clan, and can build legal relationships with 
each other on a contractual mode. The gradual contractualization of societies is 
therefore at the core of Maine’s theory, and this already makes it an interesting 
frame for our discussion. 
More specifically, it meets the required criteria to provide insights on the way 
markets develop thanks to the growth of a pre-established social capital that al-
lows individuals to trust each other to cooperate. Maine portrays the emergence 
of markets between small communities as a “moral” progress that involves the 
gradual expansion of contractual capacities. More interestingly, he describes how 
the evolution of the institution itself meets the requirement of large-scale trade. 
Also, in an anti-Hobbesian gesture, Maine takes the focus out of sanctions and en-
forcement (which we previously referred to as control) to point at what makes the 
institution of contracts an efficient coordination tool which can allow and enhance 
large-scale trade, provided it is based on social dispositions like trust. As we will 
later see, Maine applied this frame by playing a significant role in the drafting of 
the 1872 Indian Contract Act. More explanation on its conceptual background is 
necessary to understand how. 
160 marc goëtzmann*      TCRS
From Ancient Law and beyond, Maine is interested, just as many of his contem-
poraries, in the “village-communities” that he believes are found in great numbers 
in India in his days. The historians of his time provided him with similar examples 
in the past of all European societies, where one could allegedly find such self-suf-
ficient communities, with individuals connected fictionally or not by their blood, 
who cultivated land collectively (Maine 1861: 245).
In Maine’s opinion, markets emerge in the unregulated space between self-
sufficient communities (Maine 1871: 192). No community has the authority over 
others in this neutral space. Moreover, none of the specific sets of customs regu-
lating one of these communities has any legitimacy to regulate the relationships 
between the different communities. The solution to this normative void there-
fore knows the following constraints: no superior authority will be the source 
of the rules of trade and enforcement will therefore prove challenging. In other 
words, communities will have to rely on each other’s good faith to be able to 
trade with each other. It is safe to assume that Maine has a similar process to 
that of the constitution of the Jus Gentium in mind. He describes the process 
as follows: before being considered a kind of “natural law” by roman lawyers, 
the jus gentium was nothing but a set of common rules, built thanks to compari-
sons between the different sets of customs of the neighboring communities with 
which Rome had to trade. For Maine it is “in part originally a Market law”, the 
“parent” of International law (Maine 1871: 193). 
The rules that allow markets to function must therefore be distinct from the 
customs and practices of each separated community, but also be compatible with 
them. They must be fair to all parties but, most importantly, they need to func-
tion without a third-party to enforce them through sanctions. Also, for Maine, the 
clarity and the consistency of rules are, rather than the guarantee of sanctions by 
an external authority, instrumental in the development of a trusting relationship 
between partners. A clear normative frame is the priority so that individuals who 
come from different communities engage in market exchanges. 
The virtuous circle described by Bowles is thus in place. Parties to an exchange 
have a first incentive to cooperate: their mutual gains. Under the right conditions, 
individuals will thus be able to trust each other to be able to trade goods and 
services. Trust is the correct word for a leap of faith with little or no guarantee of 
sanctions against non-cooperators. Those who do not will gradually learn to trust 
each other more and will graduate cooperate on a larger scale, trusting each other 
more and more. 
Nevertheless, the gradual development of trust in market exchanges is neither 
the mere product of a favorable institutional context, nor the sole result of an ac-
cumulation of positive experiences of trustworthiness. Maine does not defend the 
idea that the social capital that was accumulated in “village-communities” is simply 
transferred to market exchanges when it meets with the right institutions. Instead, 
he describes how institutions like contract and property law gradually evolve, alto-
gether with social dispositions. This allows to bridge the gap between the emerge 
of social trust in small-scale societies and the development of markets. 
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3.2. The development of trust as a moral disposition and the evolution of 
contracts
Maine describes the development of trust in moral terms, equating it with an 
increase of the “morality” in society. This increase is directly connected to the 
expansion of market exchanges and their separation from the rules of closed com-
munities. In Maine’s thought, this movement is tightly linked to the history of 
contractual law, exemplified according to him by the history of roman contracts. 
According to Maine, “Contracts” depend on “virtues”, or on the development of 
specific “moral obligations”. Unsurprisingly, these virtues are none other than “good 
faith and trust”, that happen to be more “diffused” than before at any point of the 
evolution of societies (Maine 1861: 306). He conceives his opinion as being contrary 
on his contemporaries, who would tend to believe the opposite, that virtues are in 
decline. The reason for this incorrect impression would lie in the fact that they witness 
shocking frauds. Nonetheless, according to Maine, shocking breaches of contract can 
only take place in a world where individuals rely, for their daily interactions, on mere 
confidence in each other, including towards strangers. To illustrate his thought, Maine 
points at the fact that in criminal Roman Law, the most ancient form of dishonesty that 
was punished was only theft. Meanwhile, English criminal law, in his time, recently 
started to “prescribe punishment for the frauds of Trustees”. Obviously, for trustees to 
be punished in case of fraud, the possibility of entrusting someone with large responsi-
bilities over one’s property needed to be possible a priori (1861: 3067). 
Maine proposes an explanation for the underlying cause of this evolution:  
(…) in the interval between their days and ours, morality has advanced from a very 
rude to a highly refined conception – from viewing the rights of property as exclusively 
sacred, to looking about the rights growing out of the mere unilateral reposal of confi-
dence as entitled to the protection of the penal law. (1861: 307)
Morality here is to be understood in its larger sense: that of social dispositions. 
Such dispositions evolved, following a change in the perception of property: from 
viewing it as “exclusively sacred” to considering that a trust, the act of transferring 
one’s rights to some goods to another person (“the mere reposal of confidence”), 
deserves the protection of the law. One could notice here that the “protection of the 
penal law”, or the threat of sanctions, merely offers a backing to trusting actions. 
In any case, Maine connects two parallel movements to each other: a trans-
formation of property rights and the gradual evolution of contractual law. The 
transformation of property rights starts at one extreme, where no individual is a 
true owner: property belongs to a social group, the community or the extended 
family. As resources are essential to the sustainability of the group, no member can 
freely dispose of them, with the exception of some marginal acquisitions. Prop-
erty is therefore considered as a patrimony, of which management is entrusted to 
a patriarchal leader in the societies Maine studies, the equivalent of the Roman 
paterfamilias. The paterfamilias is considered himself as nothing but the manager 
of a fund (Maine 1861: 233-235). Originally, property is therefore, as Maine puts it 
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specifically, a “bundle of rights”, expression which he appears to use to designate 
the Roman universitas juris, a set of rights and duties connected to a person (Maine 
1861: 177-178). 
The idea that property is a “bundle of rights” aims at describing two essential 
features of this context, where the village-community exploits its resources: first, 
the fact that property is a set of rights as well as of duties, granted by the collec-
tive itself, even when it regards individual rights to appropriation; second, that 
individuals are in the position of “owners” only to the extent that they manage a 
common fund they have the duty to preserve and transfer to future generations 
(Maine 1861: 178). In this context, property relations are defined by the imperative 
of preserving a common fund (1861: 262). 
Maine believes that the history of property can be described as the general 
movement from this patrimonial conception of property to the idea of property 
as a dominion on things, where one individual can dispose of goods at will. This 
movement is necessarily connected to the development of trade: as communities 
get more interconnected, and as their survival depends less and less on a specific 
stock of resources, located on a specific territory, individuals are increasingly al-
lowed to dispose freely of more goods. This explains why the process can and must 
be incremental: commercial relationships develop gradually, from the exchange 
of secondary or surplus goods in a context where stability is guaranteed by the 
existence of the community and its “sacred” property. Relations of solidarity and 
constraint within the community provide a stable frame from which individuals 
can start exchanging with strangers, but only at the margins, where risks are con-
trolled.  
The later evolutionary process relies on the development of “moral” disposi-
tions, in Maine’s words, and these moral dispositions are in return gradually re-
inforced in the process. Instead of describing this as a vague circular relationship 
between the development of market relationships and of the disposition to trust, 
Maine highlights the instrumental role of contracts. This evolution is directly cor-
related to the evolution of property rights. Goods are first exchanged and trans-
ferred through heavily constraining ceremonies. As community-based constraints 
are loosened, property can be exchanged more and more freely. Even though 
Maine provides great details of this process, one can sum it up in the following 
way. Ceremonial requirements are first meant to frame exchanges in a context 
where trust in contractual relationships is not fully established because goods are 
still controlled by distinct communities. These requirements are gradually less con-
straining, until forms of contract that only rely on an exchange of promises by 
parties is enough to be binding. The community loses its grip upon contractual re-
lationships, while individuals can gradually contract with other regardless of their 
community of origin (Maine 1861: 313).
Maine goes into many details about the types of contracts that emerged in Roman 
contractual law (1861: 338-9). The important point to remember is that the technical 
changes in contracts are responsible for the gradual development of moral disposi-
tions, mainly trust, that sacralizes, through a sense of obligation, the mere exchange 
of wills by individuals regardless of their community of origin. Enforcement there-
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fore comes only after further “moral” developments. Even more than just catching 
up, the law leaves more and more room for individuals to determine the terms of 
their contracts. The true institutional basis for the development of trust is there-
fore not a mighty Leviathan, that would suddenly allow individuals to contract with 
each other at the very moment it allows them to build a social contract. Dispositions 
to respect contracts are the product of an evolutionary process which institutional 
basis lies in the simplification, unification and formalization of contractual proceed-
ings, rather than on the threat of sanctions by an external authority. This discussion 
resonates with Bowles’s conclusions that, while using the threat of sanctions and 
demanding more complete terms would be counterproductive, the formalization of 
contractual terms remains essential (Bowles 2016). The systematic recognition of 
contractual arrangements, even when they are of customary nature, is also a central 
point among Hernando De Soto’s recommendations to foster harmonious economic 
development in context of legal pluralism (De Soto 2000).
Maine’s interest in the role of “possession” as a legal tool, inspired by Savigny’s 
work on Roman law (Savigny 1856: 7-8), is also connected to this process: posses-
sion allowed to consider that individuals, despite the lack of formal property titles, 
could see some rights similar to those of owners respected, and acquire formal 
property rights thanks to prescription. According to Maine, possession was just a 
transitional way to legitimize claims that lacked formal proof (1861: 254). Posses-
sion also plays an essential role in economic transactions. For them to happen, it 
is essential that the mere possession of goods and their simple transfer are enough 
and that no more formalities are required. This can explain why the acquiring sto-
len goods on a market in good faith is not always reprehensible in all legal systems. 
Relying on that fact, Mikhail Xifaras, in his analysis of 19th century doctrinal 
debates about property in the French Civil Code, interestingly points to the fact 
that trust, and not law, is the guarantee for the property of goods that circulate 
in economic exchanges (Xifaras 2004: 171). These reflections on possession are 
also for Maine meant to support a critique of contractualism and more specifi-
cally of Hobbes (Maine 1861: 257). This brings more support to the argument 
that trust between individuals is not created by the Leviathan’s ability to enforce 
rules backed by sanctions but comes from a larger background of cooperative be-
haviors. While contractualists like Hobbes describe how the “discipline of force” 
is necessary to bring separated individuals together and allow them to trust each 
other, Maine argues that trust between strangers emerges from preexisting institu-
tional arrangements and their transformation.
3.3. Henry Sumner Maine and the Indian Contract Act of 1872
One excellent example of Maine’s thought on the role of trust and contract 
law in the development of markets is illustrated by his influence on the Indian 
Contract Act of 18723. In British India, legal courts were faced with the impos-
3 The Indian Contract Act of 1872 can be found at this address: http://www.dezshira.
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sible task of taking elements of British law as a reference while accommodating 
their decisions to local customs, mostly out of fear of disrupting the balance of 
traditional communities. This balancing act was not the only issue, since local 
customary law was far from being a systematic body of laws, especially in matters 
that interested the British the most: land law and contract law. Without the cre-
ation of a set of general and formal contract laws, resorting to local customs was 
nearly impossible: as local customs were primarily focused on the task of settling 
feuds between individuals within their shared community, dealing with conflicts 
opposing individuals from different communities proved quite a challenge (Roy 
and Swamy 2016: 128).
Naturally, foreign investors who wished to bring their business to India had to 
resort to multiple intermediaries to interact with local producers (Roy and Swa-
my 2016: 129). This was particularly the case for the indigo trade. As unresolved 
and sometimes violent disputes multiplied themselves, the absence of a general 
customary law of contracts became a larger problem. Despite some attempts 
at finding unifying principles of contractual law in the 18th century, trade was 
therefore widely impacted. Distrust was the main characteristic of the relation-
ships between investors and cultivators, especially in the indigo trade (Roy and 
Swamy 2016: 123). Tacit conventions, frequent and efficient among members of 
the same communities, were not possible between investors and cultivators who 
had not established prior relationships. Beyond the local networks of reciprocity, 
the absence of a formal contract law was therefore catastrophic, leading to the 
Indigo Mutiny of 1859, one of the largest and most violent rebellions against the 
British rule. 
The Mutiny started with cultivators refusing to sell their indigo to the Euro-
pean investors who owned the factories where indigo was transformed, violat-
ing their contracts with them. Contracts were indeed the crux of the problem: 
from the 1820s to the Mutiny, judges had only two options to settle contractual 
disputes: either they used their judgment to rule according to equity and depart 
from existing rules, or they used penal law, a domain that was much clearer, to 
enforce contractual obligations. Nevertheless, jurists felt that building a proper 
set of contractual laws was necessary. Most of the disputes emerged from the 
fact that investors complained that cultivators were exploiting the vagueness of 
their contracts, most of the times non-written ones. An inevitable vicious circle 
was in place: the more investors sought to establish clearer and more constrain-
ing terms, the less cultivators respected their obligations willingly. As a conse-
quence, more distrust led investors to demand more clarity regarding the terms 
of the contract and to put more pressure on them, sometimes threatening them 
with violence, which was naturally increasing the amount of distrust, and so on 
and so forth.
The first recommendations of the legal committee that was given the task to find 
solutions to this problem were to emphasize institutional solutions to this issue of 
com/library/file/4386/download.
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trust: an efficient and speedy justice system, the official record of clearer and more 
explicit contracts, the writing of an independent contract law (Roy and Swamy 
2016: 123). These recommendations remained as such until 1862, when Henry 
Sumner Maine became a member of the Legal Council in India. Maine had to bat-
tle against fears of new riots by the locals. He supported the idea of uniform con-
tractual code, mixing local customs with Western elements, believing that simple 
and efficient procedures, as long with clarified contractual terms, would solve the 
vicious circle of distrust that was opposing investors and cultivators. The political 
discussion ended up with a victory on Maine’s side, despite some concessions to 
the opposing view.
Some conclusions
Both Elinor Ostrom and Henry Sumner Maine would agree that there is noth-
ing natural in trusting others in a social context, no matter the scale. Trusting com-
mercial partners who come from different communities that one’s own is not natu-
ral, but neither is trusting one’s neighbor no to let his sheep overgraze. Therefore, 
one can neither argue that markets produce trust ex nihilo, nor that it just comes 
from a further institutional development, as if the social disposition to trust could 
be transferred from one context to the other.
For both Ostrom and Maine, trust emerges at the simplest level of social co-
operation. At that stage, it is not solely based on mere familiarity and positive 
personal experiences. A specific context and specific (customary) mechanisms are 
necessary for individuals to find each other trustworthy, before they can develop a 
disposition to trust. Ostrom thereby underlines the gradual nature of the develop-
ment of trust, considered as a learning process. To this, Maine provides a way to 
bridge the gap between interactions within small-scale communities and market 
exchanges. He does not argue that markets simply harness social trust then foster 
it. The “moral” dispositions required for individuals to trade on a large-scale, in a 
complex society, are developed alongside gradual institutional changes, property 
and contract law being instrumental. 
Such perspectives on social trust highlight its rational nature and the comple-
mentarity between trust and trustworthiness. At no point of social development 
can trust, as a social disposition, completely be disconnected from the support 
of an institutional frame that allows individuals to find each other trustworthy. In 
Luhmann’s words, trust is “systemic” from the smallest communities to the larg-
est. Meanwhile, trust can be a social capital, a way for individuals to interact with 
strangers they do not know by granting them a certain level of trustworthiness by 
default. Nonetheless, trustworthiness must be established at the most basic level 
of cooperation so that trust can develop. Moreover, trusting relationships between 
trading partners are also built on a mixture of institutions and trustworthiness. It is 
maybe in that way that markets might be said to foster trust, but it therefore does 
not seem to be an intrinsic property of market exchanges. 
166 marc goëtzmann*      TCRS
References
Al-Ubaydli, O., Houser, D., Nye, J., Paganelli, M. P., & Pan, X. S. (2013), “The causal effect 
of market priming on trust: An experimental investigation using randomized control”, 
PloS one, 8(3), e55968.
Arrow, K. J. (1972), “Gifts and exchanges”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1(4): 343-362.
Barr, A., Ensminger, J., Henrich, J., Wallace, C., Barrette, C., Bolyanatz, A., ... & Marlowe, 
F. (2009). “Homo aequalis: a cross-society experimental analysis of three bargaining 
games”, Documento CEDE, (2009-09).
Berkes, F. (1986), “Local-level management and the commons problem : A comparative 
study of the Turkish coastal fisheries”, Marine Policy, 10: 215-229.
Bowles, S. (2011), “Is liberal society a parasite on tradition?”, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
39(1): 46-81.
Bowles, S. (2016), The Moral Economy: Why Good Incentives Are No Substitute for Good 
Citizens, Yale University Press. 
Brennan, J., and Jaworski J. (2015), Markets Without Limits: Moral Virtues and Commercial 
Interests. Routledge.
Brown, M., Falk A. and Fehr, E., (2004), “Relational contracts and the nature of market 
interactions.” Econometrica, 72(3): 747-780.
Camera, G., Casari, M., and Bigoni, M. (2013), “Money and trust among strangers”, Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110(37): 14889-14893.
De Soto, H. (2000), The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in The West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, Basic Civitas Books.
Fehr, E., and Rockenbach. B. (2003), “Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altru-
ism.” Nature, 422 (6928): 137.
Greif, A. (1989), “Reputation and coalitions in medieval trade: evidence on the Maghribi 
traders”, The journal of economic history, 49 (4): 857-882.
Gunning, J. P. (1972), ‘Towards a Theory of the Evolution of Government’, in Explorations 
in the Theory of Anarchy, Gordon Tullock (ed.), Blacksburg, VA: Center for the Study of 
Public Choice, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University: 19–26.
Hess, C. and Ostrom, E. (2007), “Private and Common Property Rights”, Workshop in 
Political and Policy Analysis, Indiana University.
Hume, D. (1739-40), A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Ex-
perimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects & Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion, London: Longmans, Green & Co. 
Hobbes, T. 1983 [1651]. De Cive. The English version entitled, in the first edition, Philo-
sophicall rudiments concerning government and society, Warrender, Howard (ed.), Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Levi, M. (1988), Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Lorenz, E. (1999), “Trust, Contract and Economic Cooperation”, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 23: 301-315. 
Luhmann, N. 1979 [1973], Trust and Power, New York: Wiley.
Matthews, R. (1988), “Federal Licensing Policies for the Atlantic Inshore Fishery and Their 
Implementation in Newfoundland, 1973-1981”, Acadiensis: Journal of the History of the 
Atlantic Region, 17: 83-108. 
Malhotra, D. and Murnighan, J. K. (2002), “The Effects of Contracts on Interpersonal 
Trust”, Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 47, 3: 534-559. 
TCRS      leaving town for the market 167
Malhotra, D. and Lumineau F. (2011), “Trust and Collaboration in the Aftermath of Con-
flict: The Effects of Contract Structure”, Academy of Management Journal, 2011, vol. 54, 
5: 981-998. 
Ostrom, Elinor. (1990), Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collec-
tive Action, Cambridge University Press. 
Perera, J. (1986), “The Gal Oya Farmer Organization Programme: A Learning Process?”, 
in Participatory Management in Sri Lanka’s Irrigation Schemes, International Irrigation 
Management Institute, Digana Village Via Kanday, Sri Lanka: IIMI: p. 89-91.
Roy, T. and Swamy, V. (2016), Law and the economy in colonial India, London: The Univer-
sity of Chicago Press.
von Savigny, C., F. (1856), Traité de droit romain, M. Ch. Guenoux (trans.), Paris: Firmin 
Didot.
Sumner Maine, H. (1861), Ancient Law: Its Connection With The Early History Of Society 
And Its Relation To Modern Ideas, London: Murray.
Sumner Maine, Henry. (1871), Village-Communities in the East and West, New York: Henry 
Holt and Company.
Viano, F., L. (2009), “Ithaca transfer: Veblen and the historical profession”, History of Eu-
ropean Ideas, 35(1): 38-61.
Xifaras, M. (2004), La Propriété. Étude de philosophie du droit, Paris: PUF. 
Zak, P. J. (2008), “The neurobiology of trust”, Scientific American, 298(6): 88-95.
Zak, P. J. and Knack. S. (2001), “Trust and growth”, The Economic Journal, 111: 295-321.

